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The Spouse's Nonbarrable Share: A Solution
in Search of a Problem
Sheldon J. Plager
When a husband or wife wishes to leave his or her property to some-
one other than the surviving spouse, the state may feel compelled to
intervene by requiring that the surviving spouse be permitted to share
in the deceased's estate. The decision to accord the surviving spouse
a share in the estate of the other regardless of the wishes of the dece-
dent is attributable to a network of policy concerns which surround
the protection of the family unit-the obligation of support, the pre-
sumed contribution of the survivor's family, and the state's interest in
protection from the burden of indigents-as well as to policies favoring
economy in transmission of property, equality of sexes, and fairness
among beneficiaries. Giving effect to these concerns, however, frustrates
such other policies as freedom of testamentary disposition, protection
of creditors, and alienability of land, all of which militate against non-
barrable shares for the surviving spouse.1
Faced with this conflict, the eight-community property states2 and
the civil law state of Louisiana protect the surviving spouse primarily
by providing for a form of shared inter vivos ownership of marital
property. Of the remaining forty-one states, only two leave the testator
unfettered;3 thirty-nine states permit the surviving spouse to claim a
share in the estate of the deceased spouse.4 The purpose of this study is
Sheldon J. Plager, Professor of Law, The University of Illinois, is a member of the
Illinois and Florida bars. He received an A.B. degree in 1952 from the University of
North Carolina, an LL.B. degree in 1958 from the University of Florida, and an LL.M.
degree in 1961 from Columbia University. This article was written in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of the Science of Law in the Faculty of Law,
Columbia University.
1 See Scoles, Conflict of Laws and Nonbarrable Interests in Administration of Decedents'
Estates, 8 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 151, 156-61 (1955).
2 Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, and Washington.
Even in these states the surviving spouse may have some elective rights in the testamentary
estate. See, e.g., Brown and Sherman, Elections To Take By Will: Some Practical Consid-
erations, 23 CALIF. S.B.J. 11 (1948); Wren, The Widow's Election: Drafting and Tax Con-
siderations in Community and Common Law States, 100 TRusTs & ESTATES 13, 108 (1961).
3 North and South Dakota.
4 Thirty-eight of the thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia have statutes
purporting to give a surviving spouse-husband or wife or both-the right to choose
between the deceased spouse's testamentary largess and a legislatively-decreed portion
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not to quarrel with policies underlying the decision to protect the sur-
viving spouse; the question explored here is the soundness of the
means by which the thirty-nine states have implemented that decision.
Although the specifics vary considerably, the thirty-nine states men-
tioned above have generally provided that the surviving spouse be en-
titled to a predetermined share, usually a third or a half, of the de-
ceased's wealth. This portion is available regardless of the testator's
wishes, regardless of the survivor's financial need, and regardless of
how much or how little the survivor may have contributed to that
wealth. This solution, generally known as the forced share, has one
major advantage-it is relatively simple to administer. The probate
court need only know the total value of the estate to which the forced
share applies and the applicable proportion of the estate (as set out in
the statute) to which the surviving spouse is entitled. There is usually
no occasion for the taking of testimony about family relationships and
history and no need for the application of judicial discretion. This
simplicity, however, harbors the method's principal disadvantage-its
total insensitivity to the surviving spouse's actual need, the contribu-
tion the survivor may have made to the estate, and the reason why the
testator, who presumably knew his family situation as well as anyone,
preferred his particular dispository plan.
An alternative is to provide a system of maintenance payments to the
surviving spouse (and perhaps to other relatives) payable out of the
decedent's estate. The amount of the payments would be keyed to the
individual need of the survivor, the interests of persons who otherwise
would be entitled to the deceased's property, the conduct of the sur-
vivor with relation to the deceased, the deceased's reasons for his dis-
positions, and the many other factors that might be relevant in a par-
ticular case. This is essentially the system established by the British
Commonwealth decedent's family maintenance legislation.5
of the deceased's estate. These states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecti-
cut, Delaware, Georgia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming. South Carolina gives the surviving wife common-law dower. S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 19-153 (1962). No choice is required by statute, although the husband by appropriate
provision in his will can force the wife to choose between his testamentary provision
and her dower share. See Note, Widow's Election Between Dower and Other Benefits,
9 S.C.L.Q. 277 (1957).
5 See Inheritance (Family Provision) At, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 45; Family Protection
Act, 1900, N.Z. Stat. 64 Vict. No. 20, as amended, N.Z. Stat. 11 Geo. 6, No. 60, § 15 (1947);
Laufer, Flexible Restraints on Testamentary Freedom: A Report on Decedents' Family
Maintenance Legislation, 69 HARv. L. REv. 277 (1955).
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The advantage of this approach is its ability to shape the remedy to
the facts and circumstances of each individual case. However, this flex-
ibility is also its weakness. To do the job adequately requires that the
court familiarize itself not only with the state of the deceased's finances,
but with the whole range of his personal and family affairs. It further
requires that the court exercise a high degree of judgment in balanc-
ing the various claims on the available assets-claims which can prob-
ably never be fully satisfied. This in turn means the court must be
given a large measure of discretion, both to determine the protection
afforded the spouse and the effect to be given to the testator's will.
Rather than argue on an a priori basis for one or the other of these
alternatives, or for one of the variations that have been proposed from
time to time,6 this study will examine the published data on patterns
of testamentary behavior in an effort to determine the dimensions of
the surviving spouse's problem. How widespread is the need for pro-
tection against disinheritance? On the whole, how does the surviving
spouse fare in the competition for the deceased's favor? If the need is
widespread and protection of the surviving spouse is a substantial ac-
tivity of the courts, then economy of judicial effort alone may require
that the forced share alternative be retained. Furthermore, if the im-
pact of the forced share legislation is widespread, if many individuals
and many estates are directly affected by it, a general reluctance to vest
broad discretion in the courts in such matters may indicate the unlike-
lihood of political support for change. Under such circumstances,
rough justice may be the best that can be hoped for.
On the other hand, if the need is great for the individual, but small
in number of cases involved and in total individuals affected, rough
justice may be poorer justice than the situation requires. We may be
able to afford the luxury of individuation; to protect the surviving
spouse who has genuine need, protect the testator's dispositive plan
when there is no such need, and do it all without an undue burden on
the courts. By knowing something of the extent of the problem, we
should be able to better relate the need to the method best suited to
meet it.
I. THE AVAILABLE DATA
There are only a few published studies which explore on an orga-
nized basis the records of property transmission in a given jurisdiction
6 MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE WIoW'S SHARE ch. 22 (1960) (hereinafter cited as MAC-
DONALD); Haskell, The Power of Disinheritance: Proposal for Reform, 52 GEO. LJ. 499
(1964); Spies, Property Rights of the Surviving Spouse, 46 VA. L. REv. 157 (1960). See also
Cahn, Restraints on Disinheritance, 85 U. PA. L. REV. 139 (1936) (one of the first pro-
posals for reform).
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for a given period of time. The first American study, written by Rich-
ard R. Powell and Charles Looker of Columbia University Law School,
appeared in 1930. 7 This study was based upon New York probate court
and tax department reports for the years 1914 through 1929; it does
not appear to have involved the actual examination of individual pro-
bate files.8 (This study will hereafter be referred to as the New York
Study.)
In 1950 a lawyer, J. H. Beuscher of the University of Wisconsin Law
School, and an economist, Edward H. Ward of Montana State College,
published a report of their examination of probate court files in 415
selected proceedings in the County Court of Dane County, Wisconsin,
for decedents who died in 1929, 1934, 1939, 1941, and 1944.9 (This
study is hereafter referred to as the Wisconsin Study.)
As of this writing, there has been only one other published study
since the Wisconsin Study. In 1963, Allison Dunham of the University
of Chicago Law School completed a study of the probate court records
in ninety-seven estates for which probate proceedings were initiated in
Cook County (Chicago), Illinois, in 1953, and seventy-three estates of
decedents who died in Cook County in 1957.10 One of the aims of this
study (hereafter the Chicago Study) was to test the degree of conform-
ance between the legislatively decreed pattern of wealth distribution
through intestate succession and the pattern actually employed by
those decedents who utilized a will. As a result, the Chicago Study is
especially useful as a source of data directly relating to patterns of
wealth transmission between spouses.
In addition to these relatively comprehensive studies, there have
been several papers published providing data on various aspects of tes-
tamentary behavior. Lawrence M. Friedman, of the University of Wis-
consin Law School, published in 1964 an examination of 150 wills filed
in Essex County, New Jersey, during the years 1850, 1875, and 1900.11
This analysis (referred to hereafter as the New Jersey Wills Study) was
limited to the provisions of the testamentary instruments themselves
and did not include other documents in the probate file. A candidate
7 Powell and Looker, Decedents' Estates, 30 COLUm. L. Ray. 919 (1930) [hereinafter
cited as Powell & Looker]. There was an English study published at about the same time,
WEDG-wooD, THE ECONOMICS OF INHEMrrANCE (1929).
S The statement was made that further studies, involving probate files, were in progress,
id. at 921 n.8, but none appears to have been published.
9 Ward and Beuscher, The Inheritance Process in Wisconsin, 1950 Wis. L. REV. 393
[hereinafter cited as Ward & Beuscher].
10 Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death,
30 U. CHL L. REv. 241 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Dunham].
11 Friedman, Patterns of Testation in the 19th Century: A Study of Essex County (New
Jersey) Wills, 8 Am. J. IEGAL H~sr. 34 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Friedman].
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for a doctoral degree at the University of Kansas in 1956 surveyed the
size and composition of probated estates in Kansas for the years 1940
and 1950.12 An occasional banker, doing graduate work at the Stonier
Graduate School of Banking, surveyed local probate records or probate
court reports for information on banking practices and incidentally
collected data on testamentary behavior.1 3 A trade journal for trust men
periodically published the results of a canvas of probate court clerks
on the frequency of wills.' 4 The Federal Government regularly pub-
lishes a mass of statistics on fiduciary, gift, and estate tax returns.' 5
II. THE TRADITIONAL FUNCTION-PROTECTION AGAINST DISINHERITANCE
There is a glaring inconsistency in our law which com-
pels a man to support his wife during his lifetime and permits
him to leave her practically penniless at his death. . . The
average testator is just in his testamentary gifts to his de-
pendents, but examples of injustice often occur. In one case
brought to the attention of the Commission a man left his
entire estate to his mistress .... In another case the wife had
been the successful plaintiff in a separation action against
her husband for cruelty . . . . [She was subsequently disin-
herited.] This example of neglect is not uncommon in the
Surrogate's Courts of the State.' 6
By revealing such "blatant" inequities, the Commission to Investi-
gate Defects in the Law of Estates, in its 1928 report to the New York
Legislature, successfully argued for the enactment of legislation giving
the surviving spouse in New York a choice between the legacy pro-
vided by the decedent spouse and an elaborately computed share of
the decedent's estate. The statement in the report is taken almost ver-
batim from an address made by the chairman of the Commission,
James A. Foley, before a Bar Association meeting early in 1928.Y.
Neither in his speech nor in his report did Surrogate Foley refer to
any body of empirical data from which his conclusions as to the fre-
12 PiNEr, PROBATED ESTATES IN KANsAS-1940 AND 1950 (1956).
13 E.g., Miller, A Survey of Probate Records-Framework for Marketing Studies (Un-
published, Library of the American Bankers Assoc., N.Y., 1963); Smith, Hamilton County
(Ohio) Probate Records (Unpublished, Library of the American Bankers Assoc., N.Y.,
1941).
14 99 TRUSTS S ESTATES 414 (1960); 89 TRUSTS & ESTATES 371 (1950).
15 E.g., U.S. INT. REv. SRV., TREASURY DEP'T, PuB. No. 406, FIUCIARY, GIFT, AND ESTATE
TAx RET RNs-STATISTICS OF INCOME (1958).
16 Original Report of the Comm'n to Investigate Defects in the Laws of Estates 86
(1928), in COMBINED REPORTS OF THE [N.Y.] DECEDENT ESTATE COMMISSION 18 (1933).
17 COMBINED REPORTS OF TiE [N.Y.] DECEDENT ESTATE COMMISSION 156 (1933).
1966]
The University of Chicago Law Review
quency, and thus the social significance, of disinheritance were derived.
The two cases cited were apparently cases in his own court.18
It is likely that Surrogate Foley was simply expressing the common
understanding of mankind--or at least of lawyers. There are probably
few attorneys today with any kind of an estate practice who have not
read or heard about a case like Newman v. DoreP9-an old man, mar-
ried again, at odds with his new wife, on his death-bed instructs his
attorney to find some way of cutting her out. The inter vivos trust of
virtually all his assets executed three days before death in an effort to
negate his wife's statutory rights in his estate made this testator's
marital affairs a cause celebre in the law of estates and trusts and a
spicy addition to the law school case books. It is not surprising then
to find in much of the relevant literature an explicit assumption that
when a choice is made by the surviving spouse in favor of the forced
share it is necessitated by the unhappy relationship that existed be-
tween the spouses20 and an implicit assumption that the need of choice
is widespread, and perhaps increasing.
A. A Theory in Search of Support-Evaders and Divorcers
An effort to support this general thesis with statistical data appears
in W. D. Macdonald's exhaustive study of cases involving gratuitous
inter vivos transfers in alleged evasion of the surviving spouse's statu-
tory share.21 Macdonald begins with the assumption that the basic
goal of the nonbarrable share is to provide economic assistance to the
surviving spouse, typically the widow. 22 He acknowledges that thus
far the total number of evasion cases is not large,23 but finds evidence
that indicates to him that the number of actual evasions, if not the
volume of litigation, is likely to increase. This conclusion is based on
several factors.
First is the accelerating increase in "evasion" litigation itself. Mac-
18 Ibid. In his speech before the Bar Association, Surrogate Foley prefaced his "exam-
ples of injustice [which] often occur" with the statement: "In my experience as surrogate
I have seen several." This statement was omitted from the Commission's report.
19 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
20 E.g., "Section 18 [the provision in the New York statutes giving the surviving spouse
an election] is probably not needed or used when the couple has lived together in a
normal, nonantagonistic relationship. . . . On balance, it would appear that Section 18
is called into play by the widow, who, as a wife, had a strained relationship with her
husband." Garland, The "Non-Barrable" Share: Some Comments Regarding a Reappraisal,
32 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 218-19 (1958).
21 MAcDONALD.
22 Id. at 6.
23 Id. at 8 n.9. He suggests, however, that there may be a much larger number of
unreported cases, such as those settled or otherwise not appealed. Ibid.
[Vol. 33:681
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donald states that since 1900 the evasion cases have increased more
than fourfold, while the country's population has only slightly more
than doubled. In addition, more than 50% of these cases have been
litigated in the last twenty-five years.24 Dunham, in his Chicago Study,25
points out that Macdonald does not compare the increase in "evasion"
litigation with the increase in testacy or estates in the same period
nor with the increase in estates generally.
[Macdonald's] statistics show 17 cases for the decade ending
in 1929 and 68 cases for the eight year period ending in 1958.
If we assume they all arose in Cook County the increase is
actually less than double for if the total wills in Cook County
are taken as the base, the rate of such litigation increased
from 6 per 10,000 wills to 10 per 10,000 wills. This would not
appear alarming.26
Another factor Macdonald mentions in support of the proposition
that there is a growing need for protection of the surviving spouse is
an increase in family disharmony. 27 Although recognizing that the ex-
tent of nationwide family disharmony is difficult to assess, he finds the
rising American divorce rate significant, 2 not in itself, but because it
is accompanied by a high rate of remarriage. 29 If either of the partners
to the remarriage already has children, the situation is ripe for com-
peting demands on the parent-spouse's estate; 30 this would seem to be
true whether the remarriage was successful or not.
While it is true that the divorce rate is higher now than it was 40
years ago (1.5 per 1,000 of population in 1923 compared to 2.2 in 1960),
the present 2.2 rate is identical with the 1941 rate.31 Further, assuming
that there is a rising divorce rate, it can be argued-and Macdonald
recognizes the argument-that a high divorce rate might have the effect
of reducing the number of spouses who die unmourned. If the dishar-
monious relationship is severed by divorce there is no surviving spouse
21 Id. at 7, 8.
25 Dunham 15 n.28.
26 Ibid.
27 MACDONALD 10-15.
28 For information on the trends in marriage and divorce in the United States, see
METROPoLrrAN LIFE INS. Co., STAT. BULL., Aug. 1949, Nov. 1949; U.S. NAT'L OFFICE OF
VrrAL STAT., DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SUMMARY OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE STATISTICS: UNITED
STATES 1950 (1952). See generally ZIMMERMAN, THE FAMILY OF ToMORRoW (1949).
29 See ME OPOLrrAN LIFE INS. Co., STAT. BULL., Mar. 1948, Jan. 1949, Apr. 1951. See
also Glick, First Marriages and Remarriages, 14 Am. SOCIOL. REV. 726 (1949).
30 Macdonald estimates that children under 18 are involved in probably one half of
all divorces and annulments. MACDONALD 13.
31 Carter, Eight Myths About Divorce-and the Facts, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1964, § 6
(Magazine), p. 17.
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to disinherit. Of course, there are infinite degrees of disharmony and
many rationalizations can be found by spouses for maintaining the
marriage posture long after the desire has gone. Macdonald's prefer-
ence for reading the divorce figures as supporting the need for protec-
tion against disinheritance may not be unreasonable, but the statistics
are at best inconclusive.
B. Patterns of Wealth Transmission at Death
Even if the statistics on marital disharmony and inter vivos "eva-
sions" were less than equivocal, they would be at best only indirect
indicators of the extent to which there is a need for a forced share for
protection of the surviving spouse. More to the point are the actual
patterns of wealth transmission: By what methods do married people
in fact dispose of their accumulated wealth at death and how much of
it actually gets into the hands of the surviving spouse?
This question deals, however, with only one facet of the problem-
the frequency of the need of protection when there is a married dece-
dent with wealth. Consideration of the overall dimensions of the prob-
lem requires a look at additional data: How many people who die,
die owning accumulated wealth; how many of this favored group are
survived by spouses; of those who are, how much wealth is involved,
particularly with~respect to meeting the needs of the individual's de-
pendents? Some of these questions will be touched on here, but the
primary inquiry at this point will be focused on the question: Among
those husbands or wives who in fact die leaving both a surviving spouse
and sufficient wealth to quarrel over, how are these assets "passed on"
and how does the surviving spouse fare in the competition for the
decedent's favor?
The Available Alternatives for Transmission of Wealth-
Will Substitutes
The husband or wife who wishes to transmit accumulated wealth at
death may utilize various will substitutes, such as joint tenancy and
bank accounts with survivorship, and thus leave no estate subject to
succession proceedings; he may adopt the legislative scheme for alloca-
tion of his assets and die intestate; he may simply incorporate the leg-
islative scheme into his will; he may provide by will for an allocation
deviating in any number of ways from intestate distribution; or he
may employ a combination of these.
Terminology may be tricky. In some of the literature the term "pro-
bate estate" is sometimes used to refer to those assets passing at death
which are subject to judicial proceedings, regardless of whether the
[Vol. 33:681
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owner left a will or not. Technically, the term "probate" is limited to
procedures involving estates of decedents dying testate, as distinguished
from "administration" of intestate estates. For purposes of clarity, the
admittedly more awkward term "succession" will be used to refer to
the procedure of judicially administering assets of both testate and in-
testate decedents; the unqualified term "estate" or "succession estate"
will be used to refer to the assets subject to such procedure. The term
"probate" will be limited to its technical meaning in reference to
estates involving a will.
a. Relationship of marital status to the necessity for succession pro-
ceedings. One of the analyses made in the Chicago Study32 of the 481
decedents in the 1957 sample was of the relationship between marital
status and the existence of assets sufficient to warrant succession pro-
ceedings. The data indicated that the marital status of the decedent at
the time of death appeared to be a significant factor in determining
the presence of an estate.
The most significant marital category at time of death is
"never married." One out of four of the estates in the sample
came from this marital status, but decedents with a surviving
spouse, on the other hand, had estates in only one of nine
cases. . . . [I]f a person has a surviving spouse at time of
death ... he is less likely to have a probated estate than if
he is a widow or widower or a single person who has never
married.33
One conclusion that can be drawn from this is confirmation of what
many husbands have long maintained-the old saw about two living
as cheaply as one is pure feminine propaganda; marital status has
a negative effect on the accumulation of wealth. However, studies of
wealth distribution in the United States do not support this conclu-
sion. Lampman, in his extensive study of the estimated 1,659,000 top
wealth-holders in 1953 34-those individuals with $60,000 or more of
gross assets3-- found that 72% were married, 16% were widowers or
widows, 3% were divorced or separated, and 9% were unmarried.36
The percentage of individuals with wealth who were married was
higher than for the population as a whole.37
32 Dunham.
33 Id. at 246.
34 IA MMA, THE SHARE OF ToP WEAT.-HOLDmS IN NATIONAL WEAL.TH (1962).
35 This group, comprising only 1% of the total population, held an estimated $309.2
billion of gross assets, 30.2% of the total assets of the personal sector of the economy. Id.
at 16.
36 Id. at 99.
37 Compare with the 1950 statistics for all persons 14 years old and over: married:
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An alternative interpretation of the Chicago Study findings is that
a substantial number of married persons dispose of their assets through
will substitutes. These substitutes include joint ownership of realty,
survivorship bank accounts, and inter vivos trusts, as well as less formal
devices such as gifts causa mortis, contracts to will, informal "escrow"
arrangements, and Totten trusts. 38
b. Sources of data on will substitutes. Unfortunately there is a great
paucity of information on the frequency with which formal and in-
formal will substitute mechanisms are utilized. In the main, two
sources of reliable data are available. Certain of the transfers by will
substitute are subject to estate or inheritance taxes by federal and state
governments even though the transfers are not by will or intestate suc-
cession and therefore not part of the succession estate. While the filed
tax returns provide the raw data, these data are limited to those estates
of a size sufficient to warrant taxation. Furthermore, a copy of the fed-
eral estate tax return is not usually part of the estate file and the federal
government as a matter of policy does not permit general public in-
spection of individual returns,3 9 although periodic statistical analyses
of large blocks of returns are published.40 On the other hand, state
inheritance tax returns are often part of the public record and, to the
extent will substitutes are reported in them, the data may be obtained.
The other source of data is the occasional judicial proceeding under-
taken for the purpose of providing record title to property passing
outside the succession estate. For example, if husband and wife own
real estate as joint tenants with survivorship (or tenancy by the entire-
ties in jurisdictions recognizing that estate), the interest of the first to
die automatically terminates at death and the survivor owns the entire
property by operation of law. Unless the jurisdiction has a statutory
procedure for establishing termination, the survivor typically estab-
lishes his ownership of record simply by filing an affidavit of death or
a copy of the death certificate.41 Some states provide by statute for a
-male 68%, female 66.1%; widowed: male 4.2%, female 12.2%; divorced: male 1.7%,
female 2.2%; unmarried: male 26.2%, female 19.6%. Figures for March 1950. U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES 36, table
31 (1963).
38 It is of interest to note that the more recent casebooks on estates and trusts have
begun to emphasize the significance of these "inter vivos" arrangements as alternatives
for the transmission of wealth at death. See, e.g., ScoEs 9: HALBACH, DECEDENTS' EsTATES
AND TRUSTS ch. 8 (1965); RrcHiE, ALFOa, & EFFLAND, DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS
ch. IX (2d ed. 1961).
39 Congress has declared that tax returns constitute public records, INT. REV. CODE OF
1954 § 6103(a), but the President, under the authority given him by Congress, ibid., has
strictly limited public inspection. Treas. Regs. § 301.6103(a) (1963).
40 See, e.g., note 15 supra.
41 See 1 FucK, ABTRACr AND TrrLE PRAcrICE § 464 (1958).
[Vol. 33:681
The Spouse's Nonbarrable Share
voluntary judicial proceeding which establishes the fact of death and
terminates the joint tenancy. -42 The court order when filed of record
becomes prima facie evidence of the facts recited. A few states make
such proceedings mandatory in order to establish of record the sur-
vivor's right to the property.43
c. Inheritance tax returns. In the Chicago Study, twelve of the 1957
estates were selected at random and their Illinois inheritance tax re-
turns were analyzed for the purpose of determining the extent to which
a deceased died with taxable assets that were not included within the
succession estate.44
Of the twelve estates, five showed taxable assets all of which were
included in the succession estate. Seven had some taxable assets not
subject to succession proceedings. The total taxable assets of these
twelve estates were $1,369,340.96. Of this amount, the net taxable assets
subject to succession proceedings were $1,259,570.30; the total of tax-
able assets passing through will substitutes were $109,770.66. Thus,
only about 8% of the total taxable wealth transmitted at the death of
these twelve decedents was transmitted through a will substitute; 92%
passed by will or intestate succession.
Information was not given in the study as to how many of the twelve
estates were testate and how many intestate. However, it was stated that
5.2% of the total assets subject to succession proceedings passed in the
intestate estates, whereas 32.7% of the total assets transmitted through
will substitutes was allocable to these same intestate decedents. 45
It would be hazardous in the extreme to attempt to generalize on
the basis of this information about the role of will substitutes in the
transmission of property. First, the sample is extremely small. Second,
not all assets transmitted by a will substitute are includable in the
inheritance tax return.4 16 Finally, since the estates were not analyzed in
42 E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1170-75; MICH. Comp. LAws § 702.116 (1948).
43 E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 230.47, 230A8 (Supp. 1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 600.21
(Supp. 1963). Whether the advantages of orderly procedures of record which result from
required termination proceedings are worth the time and expense involved is open to
question. In 1951, the California Legislature passed a bill, apparently with little notice,
requiring judicial proceedings in order to terminate a joint tenancy; recording of the
death certificate would no longer suffice. One of the state's newspapers launched a cru-
sade against the bill, seemingly on the grounds that it was an unnecessary expense for
the survivor and benefited only the Bar. The State Bar disclaimed ownership. The gov-
ernor placed the matter before a special session of the legislature in 1952 and the bill
was repealed. ABA SECrION OF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST LAw, 1952 PROCEED-
INGS 36 [hereinafter cited as PRocEEDINGs].
44 Dunham 264.
45 Id. at 265.
46 Under Illinois law, for example, life insurance is not taxable on death, and there-
fore not includable in the return.
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terms of marital status, any conclusions regarding interspousal trans-
missions would be purely speculative.
d. Joint ownership of real property. There is some data available
on the extent to which joint tenancy has been utilized as a will sub-
stitute. Of the seven estates in the Chicago Study in which the inher-
itance tax return listed some taxable assets not subject to succession
proceedings, six had real estate held in joint tenancy and two had non-
succession taxable property by reason of gifts in contemplation of
death (one had both a contemplation of death gift and jointly held
realty).47 Again, it does not appear in the study whether these jointly
held assets passed to a surviving spouse.
Although Illinois does not have a statutory procedure for judicial
termination of joint tenancy, Wisconsin does. In the Wisconsin Study,
it was found that thirty-three of the 415 proceedings examined in-
volved termination of a joint tenancy.48 This does not mean that these
were all of the estates containing jointly held property; these were
estates containing only jointly held property. The extent to which
jointly held property was included in the other estates along with non-
jointly held property was not shown. The property involved in each of
these thirty-three cases was realty. The value was apparently not avail-
able in most of the cases. Although exact figures were not given, the
statement was made that the surviving joint tenant was "practically
always the wife or husband. '49
In 1952 an American Bar Association committee50 sought informa-
tion regarding joint ownership of real property in the United States
by sending a questionnaire to a member of the bar in each of the
states."1 One of the questions was: "As between husband and wife,
what percentage of real property titles are held in joint tenancy?" The
question itself was somewhat ambiguous-did it purport to ask what
percentage of real property owned either by a husband or wife was held
in a co-tenancy which co-tenancy was a joint tenancy with the spouse
or did it ask, if property was held in co-tenancy between husband and
wife, what percentage was joint tenancy (or tenancy by the entireties)
rather than tenancy in common? In any event, the responses ranged
from Vermont, "very small percentage," to Florida, "at least half," to
Illinois, Iowa, and Minnesota, indicating 80% or more.52
47 Dunham 264.
48 Ward & Beuscher 397.
49 Ibid.
50 Committee on Community Property and Jointly Held Titles to Real Property, Sec-
tion of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law.
51 See PROCEEDINGS 33.
52 The Illinois respondent indicated 80% of homes, less of other properties.
[Vol. 33:681
The Spouse's Nonbarrable Share
The Committee felt that "the significant development suggested by
the answers is the increasing popularity and use of joint tenancy. No
state reported a decrease in joint tenancy holdings, while in a number
of states the increase in percentage of such holdings is marked."5 3 Un-
fortunately the Committee's report did not give the data against which
the percentages were compared, or the basis upon which the question-
naire's respondents made their judgments, or even the number (out of
presumably forty-eight)" who responded.54 On the whole, there is not
sufficient information known about the method of obtaining the data
and the sources utilized to warrant attaching much probative value to
the findings.
e. Inter vivos trusts. While a few states require periodic reports to
an appropriate governmental agency by trustees of charitable trusts,55
routine reporting to a public agency for record purposes is not usually
required of a trustee of an inter vivos personal trust. The Uniform
Trustees' Accounting Act, promulgated by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1937, requires a trustee of
an inter vivos trust5 6 to file with an appropriate public official, in addi-
tion to a copy of the trust instrument, a list of the names, addresses,
and dates of birth of the known living beneficiaries, a description of
any possible unborn or unascertained beneficiaries, and an inventory
under oath of the trust property.57 The settlor, however, can remove
his trust from the coverage of the act if he so desires.5 q The act has
been enacted in Kansas, Nevada, and New Mexico.59
In the absence of routine reporting procedures by trustees,60 the
basic sources of data on inter vivos trusts are federal and, to a limited
extent, state tax returns. If an inter vivos trust is irrevocable and the
53 PROCEMDINGS 37.
54 "The response to this solicitation has been satisfactory . PROCEEDINGS 33.
55 E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12586; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-82 (1960); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 36-19, 20 (Supp. 1963).
56 The language of the act is "non-testamentary trustee," defined as "a trustee serving
under a trust created in this state otherwise than by a will, whether the trustee was
appointed by the settlor or by a court or other authority." UNIFoRm TRUSTEEs' AccOUNTING
AcT § 1.
57 Id. § 12.
58 Id. § 15.
59 KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-1601 (1963); NEv. REv. STAT. § 165.010 (Supp. 1956); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 33-2-1 (1953).
60 A number of states require a trustee of a testamentary trust to file a periodic ac-
counting with the Probate Court or other court of appropriate jurisdiction. The statutes
are usually expressly limited to testamentary trusts. Florida, for example, provides that
the statute may apply to inter vivos trusts, but only if the settlor specifically so provides
in the trust instrument. For a collection of the statutes by states, see BooERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUsrEES §§ 965-69 (2d ed. 1962).
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settlor retains no substantial interest such as a right to income, the
transfer into trust is in effect an outright gift of the beneficial interests.
This type of transfer is not generally in the nature of a will substitute;
the tax gatherer recognizes this, and if it is taxed at all it is taxed as a
gift. 61 If, however, the settlor retains substantial control over the trust
assets until his death, such as a power to amend, alter, or revoke, he
is typically using the trust as a will substitute. 62 The tax gatherer rec-
ognizes this, and the trust assets are included as part of the settlor's
estate passing at death.63 Thus, neither gift nor estate tax returns pro-
vide direct data on how much wealth is held at any given time in
revocable trust funds created by living settlors.
In his study of top wealth-holders, Lampman estimated that of the
probable $56 billion held in personal trust funds in 1953,64 10%o, or
about $6 billion, was in revocable trusts created by persons who were
still living.65 How much of this revocable trust wealth was transferred
by married individuals and how much of it was given to spouses is not
known. However, assuming that most of the total wealth held in trust
was transferred into trust by individuals with assets over $60,000,6 it
is probable, in light of the fact that almost three-fourths of these indi-
viduals were married, 67 that at least a similar proportion of those trusts
that were revocable were created by married individuals. Using Lamp-
man's figures, this would be about $4.5 billion in revocable trusts cre-
ated by married individuals. Furthermore, a married individual who
creates a revocable trust will frequently be advised to make at least 50
per cent of the trust assets available to the surviving spouse in order
to obtain the maximum marital deduction for estate tax purposes,6
61 See 1 CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING, ch. 6 (3d ed. 1961). Of course, the trust assets may
be includable for other reasons, for example because they were transferred in contem-
plation of death. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 2035; Casner, supra at 191.
62 The revocable inter vivos trust may also be used as a means of reallocating income
for tax purposes, although there are elements of irrevocability involved. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954 § 673. On the use of the revocable inter vivos trust as a will substitute generally,
see 1 CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING ch. 5 (3d ed. 1961).
63 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 2038.
64 Lampman considers $56 billion "a conservative estimate." Lampman, op. cit. supra
note 34, at 77. Powell, on the basis of the annual reports of the U.S. Comptroller of the
Currency and other sources, estimated in 1954 that the total of assets held in private
trusts by both corporate and individual trustees exceeds $85 billion. He characterizes his
conclusion as "the author's considered (but statistically unsupported)" guess." 4 POWELL,
REAL PROPERTY 20 (1954).
65 Lampman, op. cit. supra note 34, at 76.
66 Lampman, after analyzing a study of investment patterns of individuals and statistics
of individual income tax returns with income frequency distribution from estates and
trusts, concludes that "most of the amount in trusts and estates should be allocated to
persons with estates over $60,000." Id. at 78.
67 Id. at 99.
68 An indication of the extent to which married decedents utilize the marital deduc-
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although there are some situations in which this might not be advan-
tageous. 69
f. Life insurance. Life insurance as a will substitute has the unique
characteristic of changing in value by the fact of death. In 1960, life
insurance in force in the United States had reached a new high of
$586.4 billion.70 The bulk of this constituted ordinary ($340.3 billion)
and group ($175.4 billion) policies.71 Death benefit payments in 1960
amounted to a total of $8.3 billion, of which $1.9 billion was attribut-
able to ordinary policies and $1.1 billion to group policies.72
A national consumer survey conducted in 1960 found that, among
the group sampled,7 3 71% of all the men and 57% of all the women
had some type of life insurance. 74 If the individual was head of a family
tion can be seen from Fiduciary, Gift, and Estate Tax Returns-Statistics of Income
(1958), a statistical summary published by the U.S. Treasury Department of returns filed
during the calendar year 1958. On the basis of the calculations outlined in the next two
paragraphs of this note, it can be estimated that for the 17,110 married decedents for
whom estate tax returns were filed, the total assets available after taxes for distribution
to beneficiaries, including spouses, was $4.28 billion. According to line 17, table 2 at 58,
$1.64 billion, or 38% of the calculated $4.28 billion, qualified for the marital deduction,
that is, was given to the surviving spouse outright or in such a manner as to be the
equivalent of outright ownership (e.g., assets over which the surviving spouse has a gen-
eral power of appointment. INT. RPv. CODE OF 1954 § 2056(b)(5)). This figure does not
include interests passing to the surviving spouse that did not qualify for the marital de-
duction, such as income interests for life, nor does it reflect that part of any one estate
in which the surviving spouse received more than 50 per cent of the adjusted gross estate.
Table 2 at page 58 presents for taxable estates by net estate classes, information on
gross estate, deductions, specific exemption, taxable estate, and tax. Table 6 at page 62
presents information on the number of returns, net estate, marital status, age, and sex
of decedents. The figures given for total taxable returns (line 22, table 6 at 62) were
accumulated for all age groups of married decedents. This gave the total number of
returns as 17,110, and the total of net estate for married decedents before specific exemp-
tion as $2,926,995,000.
Net estate is defined at page 53 as the taxable estate plus the specific exemption of
$60,000. In order to obtain the amount available for distribution after taxes, the entire
amount of the marital deduction, $1,642,301,000 (line 17, table 2 at 58) was added to
the net estate, as the assets qualifying for the marital deduction are necessarily attribut-
able in toto to the married decedents. To this figure was added 42% of the total char-
itable bequests of $509,364,000 (line 18, table 2 at 58). (The 42% was arrived at by
dividing $2.93 billion of net assets attributable to married decedents by $6.97 billion, the
total net estate of all decedents.) This gave the figure of $4,783,000,000, which was then
reduced by 42% of the net tax liability (line 36, table 2 at 58), or $498,000,000. This
gave the final figure, when rounded, of $4.28 billion.
69 LOWNDES & KaAmER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND Girr TAXEs § 41.10 (2d ed. 1962).
70 INsTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK: 1963, at 13 (hereinafter
cited as FAcr BOOK]. This figure represents all life insurance (excluding reinsurance ac-
quired) on residents of the United States, whether issued by United States or foreign
companies.
71 Ibid.
72 Id. at 43.
73 The size of the sample was not given.
74 FAcT BOOK 9.
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in which there was a spouse, the percentage of insureds rose to 85; if
the family unit included children under 18, it rose still higher to 89%.
By 1962, the total of life insurance in force had risen to $675.9 bil-
lion, of which $389 billion was in ordinary policies, and $209 billion
in group policies7 5 Death benefit payments in 1962 amounted to a
total of $3.8 billion, of which $2.1 billion was attributable to ordinary
policies, and $1.4 billion to group policies.76
In an analysis of death benefit payments for the month of June,
1962, it was found that, while women were the insureds in 18.6% of
the ordinary life policies which matured, only 8.2% of the total of
benefits paid were attributable to them.77 Thus, male insureds ac-
counted for 81.4% of the policies and 9L87% of the coverage. On group
policies, male insureds accounted for 87.8% of the policies and 91.5%
of the coverage.
Of the total amount of death benefits paid during the month, 60.6%
of the benefits from ordinary life policies and 75% from the group
policies were paid to wives.75 While not all the male insureds were
married, it is not unreasonable to assume 79 that the percentage of
75 Id. at 13.
76 Id. at 43.
77 Id. at 41.
78 Ibid.
79 This assumption is based on the following calculations: According to the Bureau
of the Census, in March 1962 there were 43,019,000 married men out of a total male
population of age 14 and over of 62,129,000. U.S. BuREAU OF THE CaNsus, DEP'T Or Com-
mERcE, STATricAxL ABsTRAar OF THE UNITED STATES: 1963, table 31 at 36. Standardized
for age, this meant 71.1% of the eligible male population in the United States was mar-
ried. Applying this percentage to the percentage of death benefits attributable to male
insureds the percentage of the total death benefits which can be allocated to married
male insureds is 65.3% under ordinary life policies, and 64.9% under group policies.
(This assumes that the percentage of death benefit payments can be allocated in propor-
tion to the arithmetic groupings of marrieds and non-marrieds, a statistically unsupported
proposition. The error introduced, however, is probably not large. The national consumer
survey, supra note 74, reported that the mean amount of life insurance owned in 1960
by married heads of families (typically husbands) was $10,594; the comparable figure for
unrelated male individuals was $8,196, a ratio of about 5 to 4. When reduced to the
approximately 65% of total benefits allocable to married male insureds, the potential dis-
crepancy resulting from this assumption is less than 13% and probably considerably
smaller.)
If 65.3% of the death benefits paid on ordinary life policies were attributable to married
male insureds, and if wives received 60.6% of the total payments, wives were the bene-
ficiaries of 93% of the benefits payable from ordinary life policies. By making the same
calculation for group life policies, it is seen that wives received 115% of the death bene-
fits attributable to group policy married male insureds, an obvious impossibility.
The error probably lies in assuming that the percentage of insured males who are
married is the same as the percentage of married males generally. The 1960 consumer
survey indicated that marital status had a direct bearing on life insurance coverage-
as stated above, it was estimated that 85% of married heads of families had life insur-
ance, the highest percentage of any category in terms of family status. See note 74 supra
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male insureds who were married was as high as 85, and thus the allo-
cation of death benefit payments would attribute 77% of the total
benefits paid to married male insureds. Wives then received 80% of
the proceeds of the husbands' ordinary life policies and 97% of the
group life policies.
The available data clearly suggest that to the extent life insurance
is used as a will substitute by a married person, either to create an
estate where none exists or to supplement an existing estate, the sur-
viving spouse-whether husband 0 or wife-is the object of favor and,
in the case of the wife, is probably favored to the virtual exclusion
of all others.
g. Summary. The statistics on the relationship of marital status to
the necessity for succession proceedings clearly suggest that a substan-
tial proportion of the wealth of a married individual is disposed of
through a mechanism other than succession proceedings. Joint ten-
ancy ownership between husband and wife seems to have widespread
popularity and it appears likely that over half of some $4.5 billion in
revocable trusts eventually passes to the surviving spouse of the trustor.
Of all the will substitutes, life insurance, with husbands providing
77% of the total benefits paid and wives receiving between 80% and
97% of these benefits, seems to be the most widely used and the one
from which the surviving spouse most clearly benefits. It must be re-
membered, however, that the evidence regarding each of these mech-
anisms is fragmentary and probably insufficient to provide a basis for
judging the proportion of the total assets of married decedents which
is transmitted in this fashion.
The Frequency of Wills
The assets of an individual not disposed of during his lifetime or
transmitted through a will substitute become at his death his succes-
sion estate. Unless the decedent leaves valid testamentary instructions,
and accompanying text. This is not the same as the percentage of insureds who are
married, however. That figure probably lies somewhere between the 85% figure and the
70.1% of males who are married.
80 The same calculations made above can be made for death benefits attributable to
female insureds and payable to husbands. For the month of June, 1962, 8.2% of the
death benefits paid under ordinary life policies were attributable to female insureds.
FAar Boox 41. Of eligible females, 68.3% were married. STATISTICAL ASRAcr, supra note
79, at 36. Putting these percentages together, it can be estimated that 5.6% of the
death benefits attributable to female insureds were from married individuals. (But see
note 79 supra for a potential source of error resulting from this extrapolation). Husbands
received 2.7% of the total death benefits from ordinary life policies, or about 50% of
the benefits attributable to married females. The figures for group life policies deviate
by less than 1% from those for ordinary life policies.
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distribution of this estate will be in accordance with the statutory
scheme provided for such situations. Of course, the distributees will
get only what is left after the decedent's debts are paid, including the
costs of a funeral probably conducted in a fashion to which the dece-
dent was never accustomed during his lifetime."'
The theory behind the statutory scheme of distribution is pre-
sumably "that when a man dies without a will the law should try to
provide so far as possible for the distribution of his estate in the man-
ner he would most likely have given effect to himself if he had made
a will."8' 2 Under the early English law, at a time when land was the
principle form of wealth, an owner of land was presumed to favor his
blood relatives over his spouse. Neither husband nor wife was an heir
of the other,83 although the spouse who survived was not left entirely
propertyless. The widow's dower, and to some extent the widower's
curtesy, provided a source of minimum support for the survivor's
remaining years.84
Succession to the personalty of a married person was treated differ-
ently as a result of the split in jurisdiction between the law courts and
the ecclesiastical courts.8 5 The surviving spouse, typically the widow,
appears to have been given a share of the personalty at an early date. 86
In 1670 the Statute of Distribution 87 defined the widow's intestate
81 See MrrFow, THE AMERiCAN WAY OF DEATH (1963). The dramatic presentation of
the evidence in the Mitford volume on the high cost of dying finds striking support in
the cold statistics of the Wisconsin Study, supra note 9. It was found that the proportion
of the gross estate used to pay funeral expenses ran as high as an average of 53.3% in
the group of intestate estates with a gross value of less than $2,000. Id. at 407. If the
other costs of administration are first deducted, id. at 404, and assuming no other cred-
itors, the assets remaining for distribution in this group of estates are given on the
average 79% to the undertaker, 21% to the surviving family. The percentage going to
the undertakers declined steadily as the gross estate increased. For intestate estates over
$50,000 the percentage on the average was 0.7. Ibid.
82 PARRY, THE LAW OF SuccEsSION 158 (2d ed. 1947), quoted in Dunham at 241. But
see 6 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 992 at 611 (1958): "The utilitarians, as exemplified by
Bentham, regarded statutes on intestate succession as not justified as expressions of
either 'natural law' or 'evolved human practices,' but as tools for the constructive gen-
eration of a desirable system, the details of which should conform to ethical value-
standards based on 'utility'."
83 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 176 (1950).
84 Id. at 127: "[Dower] was a reasonable product of a society in which most wealth
consisted of land, and in which it was desired to provide at least a modest social
security for surviving widows." On dower generally, see id. 212; on curtesy generally,
see id. 214.
85 See generally, 1 HoLDswoRTH, HsToRY OF ENGLISH LAW 625 (1922); Atkinson, Brief
History of English Testamentary Jurisdiction, 8 Mo. L. REV. 107 (1943).
86 PLUCKNEar, A CONCIsE HISTORY OF THE COaIrMON LAW 726 (5th ed. 1956).
87 22 & 23 Car. 2, c. 10.
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share in personalty as one-third if the husband left descendants, one-
half otherwise.
Almost two-thirds of the American jurisdictions, on the other hand,
treat the surviving husband and surviving wife alike and provide the
same pattern for distribution of both realty and personalty.88 The
share given the surviving spouse generally ranges between one-third
and one-half of the estate available for distribution, depending in
some states on whether the other eligible takers are lineal descendants
of the intestate.8 9 In the states which have not abolished the common
law distinctions the surviving spouse typically takes a fractional share
of the personalty and an interest in the realty that "bears traces of its
origin in the laws of dower and curtesy." 90
Whenever an individual leaves testamentary instructions for dispo-
sition of his property he indicates a dissatisfaction with the statutory
scheme for distribution. This raises two questions: first, how frequently
do married individuals share this dissatisfaction; and second, what
direction does their dissatisfaction take in terms of the share given
the surviving spouse? The latter question is the subject of the next
section. The former is the question explored here.
a. Wills for the living. In 1954, Columbia University Teachers
College surveyed some 60,000 of its alumni concerning their will-
making habits. In addition, the survey questionnaire was sent to about
6,000 alumni of the schools of engineering, journalism, pharmacy,
and law.
The full results of the survey were apparently never published, and,
unfortunately, the statistical analysis of the survey is no longer ex-
tant.91 However, several brief summaries of portions of the study were
reported in published sources; 92 on the basis of these reports plus in-
formation supplied by Teachers College93 it is possible to reconstruct
an overall picture of the data.94
After eliciting various personal data such as age, occupation, marital
status, and income bracket, the questionnaire asked, "do you have a
will? Yes ( ) No ( )." The tabulated responses were:
88 6 PowELL, REAL PROPERTY 624 n.93 (1958) lists the jurisdictions and cites the rele-
vant statutes.
89 Ibid.
90 Id. at 625.
91 Letter from Mr. Abel A. Hanson, Gen'l Secretary, Columbia University Teachers
College, to the author, April 2, 1964. Mr. Hanson was chairman of the ad hoc committee
reporting on the relationship of estate planning to college development programs.
92 94 TRUSTS & ESTATES 282 (1955); 6 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 995 at 606 (1958).
93 See letter, supra note 91.
94 The response to the questionnaire was astonishingly high-nearly 45,000 returns
were reportedly received within three weeks of initial mailing. Ibid.
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Per cent reporting







Some detail on the lawyer category is known. Ninety-two and eight-
tenths per cent of the lawyers replying were men; 77.5 % were married,
85.6% had dependents; the median age group was 43; the two largest
income groups earned up to $9,999 and $19,999 a year respectively,
with a few making under $5,000 and one over $50,000. Eighty-one
per cent of the lawyers who reported having a will gave everything
to one or more members of their surviving family.9 5
It must be recognized that the group surveyed by the Teachers Col-
lege was a select group of professionals, graduates of one of the lead-
ing educational institutions in the country. Their chances of accumu-
lating sufficient assets during their lifetime to comprise an estate at
death would appear to be substantially better than the average of
American adults; therefore their concern with making appropriate
testamentary disposition should be materially greater.
This suggestion finds support in a reported sampling survey on will-
making made by the Opinion Research Corporation shortly before
1949.96 On the basis of their survey, the projection was made that of
the total voting age population of the United States, only 19% had
wills, whereas among the top one-third economically, 41% had wills.
b. Wills for the dead. Table 1 presents, chronologically, data from
the various published studies on the proportion of wills to intestacies
in estates under judicial administration.
The 1930 New York Study 97 figures indicate that, while there was
a steady increase over the sixteen year period in the proportion of adult
decedents leaving wills which were probated,98 the proportion of wills
to intestacies remained more or less constant. The Wisconsin Study,99
on the other hand, found a substantially higher percentage of wills
generally but a declining proportion of testacy. The authors of the
95 94 TRUSTS & ESTATEs 282 (1955).
96 Reported in 6 Powr.L, REAL PROPERTY 606 n.2 (1958).
97 Powell & Looker 923-24.
98 E.g., New York County: 1915-8.2%, 1921-11.4%, 1929-12.5%. Id. at 924-26.
99 Ward & Beuscher.
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TABLE 1
RATIO OF WILIS TO INTFSTACIES100
N.Y. Studyt  Wisc. Study Chicago Study Trusts & Estates
Surveys
No. of Per cent No. of Per cent No. of Per cent No. of Per cent
estates testate estates testate estates testate estates testate





1929 15,880 38.0 73" 61.9
1931-35 - - - - 44
1934 - - 670 45.9
1936-40 - - - - 46
1939 - - 62* 41.8
1941-45 - - - - 43
1941 - - 72* 45.7
1944 - - 80* 39.1
1946-50 - - - - 43
1949 - - - - - - 69,097 52.5
1953 - - - - 97 60
1957 - - - - 73 55
1959 - - - - - - 100,467 60.2
Approximate, see explanation in source note, note 97.
Unknown, but probably large. See text discussion.
t Selected years only. See source note, note 97.
Wisconsin Study found "no obvious explanation" for the trend.'0
The Chicago StudyI0 2 provided data on wills versus intestacies for the
period 1931-1950 broken down into five-year increments, as well as for
the sampled years of 1953 and 1957. It is not clear from the study
how many estates were involved in the five-year groupings nor what
100 Columns 1 and 2 are derived from Powell & Looker, Decedent's Estates, 30 COLUM.
L. REv. 919, 924 (1930). Five of the 16 years covered there were selected at random and
presented here. The figures shown result from combining the statistics for both New
York and Kings Counties.
Column 4 is derived from Ward & Beuscher, The Inheritance Process in Wisconsin,
1950 Wis. L. REv. 393, 412. Column 3 is a reconstruction obtained by applying column
4 to the number of estates with wills for each of the years involved. These figures were
obtained from id. at 415-16, and were, in chronological order, 45, 31, 26, 33, and 31.
However, the figure of 166 total testate estates thus obtained does not agree with the
statement that there were 172 testate estates in the sample. Id. at 393. The source of the
discrepancy is not readily apparent. See also id. at 414, giving a third figure, 163, as
the total wills for all years.
Columns 5 and 6 are from Dunham 244.
Columns 7 and 8:1949 data are from 89 TRusrs & ESTATES 371 (1950); 1959 data from
99 TRusTs & ESTATES 414 (1960).
'01 Id. at 412.
102 Dunham.
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the source was for the percentage figures given. Apparently the figures
were based upon a survey of all succession proceedings held in Cook
County during the stated years, a number undoubtedly in the thou-
sands.103
It can be seen that the statistics based on large-scale data showed a
generally constant proportion of wills to intestate proceedings. The
New York Study for a sixteen year period (1914-1929) and the Chicago
Study for a twenty year period (1931-1950) showed an apparent varia-
tion of 8 percentage points or less. On the other hand, the Wisconsin
Study, on the basis of a sample of 867 estates,10 4 showed a range in
selected years over a fifteen year period (1929-1944) of almost 23 per-
centage points. The Chicago Study's two sampled years (1953 and
1957), involving 170 estates, had a range of only 5 percentage points,
but varied from the twenty year period figures by 17 percentage points.
In the light of the self-evident proposition that the figures derived
from large-scale data are more reliable than those derived through
sampling techniques, it appears that the ratio of wills to intestacies
did not vary markedly over a given period of time, even as long as
twenty years.
Comparing the two groups of large-scale data, it can be seen that
the New York Study during the period 1914-1929 showed an average
of 37% testacies, while the Chicago Study during the period 1981-1950
showed an average of about 45%. Does this indicate a general upward
trend in the employment of wills or is this explainable on the basis of
geographic-cultural differences? The evidence indicates both hypoth-
eses may have validity.
The geographic-cultural explanation gains support in the findings
of the two surveys by Trusts and Estates. In the 1949 survey, covering
80 counties in 16 states, the ratio of testacies ranged from a low of
82% (Bronx County, New York and Vandenburgh County, Indiana)
to a high of 74% (Travis County, Texas). 0 5 Ten years later, in a
survey covering 53 counties in 31 states, the high percentage was
(again in Travis County, Texas) 89% and the low was 27% (Washing-
ton County, Vermont).10 6
Geographical distribution alone showed little consistency in pattern.
There were substantial percentage differences between metropolitan
103 In 1949 the figure was 7,173. 89 Trusts & Estates 371 (1950) [hereinafter cited as
1949 Survey].
104 Ward & Beuscher 393.
105 89 TRUSTS & EsrATEs 371 (1950). The figures were based on statistics provided by
the clerks of the various courts with probate jurisdiction.
106 99 TRusTs & EsrATES 414 (1960) [hereinafter cited as 1959 Survey].
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areas within a single state.107 Even regional characteristics did not seem
to control. 08 On the other hand, population statistics tended to estab-
lish a discernible pattern, at least at the extremes. Among the counties
surveyed, the four largest, each with a population in excess of 1.5
million, had an overall ratio of wills to intestacies of 63%. 109 The four
smallest, with an individual population less than 61,000, had an over-
all ratio of 347.110 Undoubtedly wealth and income distribution as
well as other cultural factors contribute to the overall pattern; the
evidence is clear, as developed below, that these are significant opera-
tive variables in the individual's decision to use a will.
The hypothesis that there is an increasing ratio of wills to intestacies
is supported by a comparison of the overall percentages of the two
Trusts and Estates surveys. The two surveys were ten years apart and
showed a 7.7 percentage point increase in the use of wills-from 52.5
in 1949 to 60.2 in 1959. This contrasts sharply with the almost un-
changing percentages found in the sixteen and twenty year New York
and Chicago studies. The results of the Trusts and Estates surveys can-
not be attributed to the expanded size of the 1959 survey. If the 30
counties used in the 1949 survey are separated out of the 1959 survey
they show almost the identical ratio-60.4% -found in the overall
1959 group."'
Furthermore, both the 1949 and 1959 surveys fortuitously included
the counties involved in the three other studies in Table 1-Cook
(Chicago), Dane (Wisconsin), and New York (New York). Tables 2,
3, and 4 present a composite picture of each of these counties, utilizing
the survey statistics and those of the three studies, as well as one addi-
tional study identified in the source note to Table 4. The tables
clearly indicate an accelerating trend within each given area toward
the use of testamentary instruments.
c. Marital status as a factor in the frequency of wills. How do the
general patterns developed in the preceding section correspond with
107 E.g., Los Angeles County, 66%; San Francisco County, 37%. 1959 Survey.
108 E.g., two of the top counties percentage-wise were Fulton, Georgia, 78%., and
Westchester, New York, 75%. Among the lowest were Laramie, Wyoming, 33%, and
Merrimack, New Hampshire, 30%. 1959 Survey.
109 These counties and their 1960 populations were: Los Angeles (California), 6,038,771;
Cook (Illinois), 5,129,725; Philadelphia (Pennsylvania), 2,002,512; New York (New York),
1,698,281. The population figures given in the 1959 Survey were based on 1950 census
statistics. The 1960 figures are from U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE
COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK 1962, table 2.
110 These counties and their 1960 populations were: Laramie (Wyoming), 60,149;
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TABLE 2
RATIO OF WILLS TO ESTATES-COOK COUNTY (CmICAGO), ILLINOIS
No. of Per cent
Line Year Estates Testate
1 1931-35 * 44
2 1936-40 * 46
3 1941-45 * 43
4 1946-50 * 43
5 1949 7,173 44
6 1953 97 60
7 1957 73 55
8 1959 12,541 68
Source: See note 112.
Unknown, but probably large. See text discussion.
TABLE 3
RATIO OF WILLS TO ESTATES-DANE COUNTY (MADISON), WISCONSIN
No. of Per cent
Line Year Estates Testate
1 1929 73" 61.9t
2 1934 67* 45.9t
3 1939 620 41.8t
4 1941 72* 45.7t
5 1944 80* 39.1t
6 1949 554 55.0
7 1959 583 66.0
Source: See note 113.
* Approximate. See explanation in source note to Table 1, supra note 97.
t For estimate of reliability of these figures, see text discussion.
TABLE 4
RATIO OF WILLS TO EsTATES-NEv YORK COUNTY (MANHATIAN), N.Y.
No. of Per cent
Line Year Estates Testate
1 1914 6,852 32
2 1915 6,618 32
3 1921 7,033 33
4 1925 7,846 36
5 1929 7,847 38
6 1949 6,665 45
7 1955-56' 6,824 46
8 1959 6,892 55
Source: See note 114.
' July 1 through June 30.
112 Lines 1-4, 6, and 7 are from table 1; line 5 is from the 1949 Survey; line 8 is from
the 1959 Survey.
113 Lines 1-5 are from table 1; line 6 is from the 1949 Survey; line 7 is from the 1959
Survey.
114 Lines 1-5 are derived from Powell & Looker 923; line 6 is from the 1949 Survey;
line 7 is from Second Annual Report 2 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
ANN. REP., LmEis. Doc. No. 88, at 214 (1957); line 8 is from the 1959 Survey.
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the behavior of decedents who were married at the time of death?
Regrettably, only the Chicago Study provided data bearing on this
precise point. The 73 estates in the 1957 sample were analyzed in terms
of the decedents' marital status at death." 5 The percentage testate of







When the 1957 sample was combined with the 1953 sample"' and
the estates were viewed in terms of categories of survivors, the percen-
tage testate of all estates was:" 8
Spouse and children surviving 50
Spouse without children 46
Children without spouse 69
Neither spouse nor children
but brothers or sisters 54
Other relatives survive 67
On the basis of these figures, marital status by itself does not seem to
be a controlling factor in influencing the decision as to whether to
die testate or intestate. Obviously the data are not broad enough to
support any categorical conclusions; additional information on the
point needs to be gathered.
d. Size of estate as a factor in the frequency of wills. One of the
pleasant uses of statistics is to confirm what we have always believed.
Common experience among the estate planning trade suggests that the
more wealth an individual has, the higher the probability that he
will be familiar with the use of legal instruments to define and regu-
late property interests and will want to use such an instrument in
transmitting his wealth at death. Striking confirmation of this belief
is found in the data provided in the Chicago and Wisconsin studies
and presented graphically in Chart 1.
115 The table from which the percentages were taken, Dunham 247, does not identify
the source as the 1957 sample. However, the data given in the table on the number of
decedents in the sample clearly indicates that this was the source, and not the combined
1953 and 1957 data.
116 Ibid.
117 Again, the table from which the percentages were taken, Dunham 252, does not
identify the source, but the context in which the data is presented indicates that it is
probably the combined samples.
118 Ibid.
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The Chicago Study presented data for Cook County in 1950 show-
ing the percentage testate of all estates in six valuation brackets rang-
ing from "below $5,000" to "$100,000 and over."" 09 The total number
of estates from which the data were developed is not given; presumably
the figures were based on the complete data for that year, which would





CHART 1. PERCENTAGE TESTATE OF ALL ESTATES BY VALUE Op ESTATE
125 . . . .120. . .
115 '
110 - - - - - - - - -
0105 -. Wisconsin Study _ /
100---
95 - - - - - - - - -90
Chicago Study
so : : I I
70- - - - - - - -
65- - - - - -
60- - - - - - -
55 -, , ,
50- - - - - - •
45. . . . . . . . .
I - -40
30- - - - - - -
25 -----------------
20------------
0 "0 0 8
'o w !o cI Cj
Percentage Testate of All Estates
Source: See note 123.
119 Dunham 250. The brackets and percentage testate for each bracket were: Below
$5,000, 25%; $5,000-$9,999, 56%; $10,000-$24,999, 63%; $25,000-$49,999, 79%; $50,000-
$99,999, 86%; $100,000 and over, 96%.
120 "Tables 7 and 8 (are] taken from the last complete data for Cook County in
1950 .... " Id. at 249, In 1949, Cook County reported 7,173 estates filed. 1949 Survey.
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The Wisconsin Study presented data for each of the five years stud-
ied between 1929 and 1944 and the combined data for all five years. 121
Chart 1 was based on the combined data. The data were given in terms
of six valuation brackets, although the brackets differed somewhat
from those in the Chicago Study.122 The basis for the data was the 367
estates in the Wisconsin Study sample. While there was some variation
in the percentages for the individual years, probably due to the small-
ness of the sample, the remarkably close conformance of the overall
percentages in the two studies is apparent. 123
Chart 1 clearly illustrates that probably the most significant variable
in determining whether a decedent with wealth dies testate or intestate
is the amount of wealth he has accumulated. If net worth exceeds
$35,000 to $40,000, the chances are that three out of every four dece-
dents will utilize a dispositive instrument; if net worth is large enough
to require filing a federal estate tax return, there will be a will in
better than four out of five cases.
The chart does not tell us anything directly about the total amount
of wealth passing by will as compared to that passing through intestacy.
However, by combining the evidence indicating that something better
than 50% of all estates are testate with the fact that an extraordinarily
high percentage of the larger estates are included in the testate group,
the clear implication is that a high percentage of the total wealth
transmitted at death passes by will. Thus, it is not surprising that the
Chicago Study reported:
From the estates in the sample years 1953 and 1957 as to
which sufficient information was available to obtain a total
of the values stated for probate, it would appear that 90
per cent of the wealth transmitted at death through probate
121 Ward & Beuscher 412.
122 The brackets (in thousands) and percentage testate for each bracket were (all years
combined): 0, 10.7%; 0-5, 35.6%; 5-15, 55.6%; 15-25, 52.4%; 25-50, 75.0%; 50-200, 92.3%.
Ibid.
123 The Chicago Study curve is derived from Dunham 250. The graph was constructed
by locating the percentage figures midway between the valuation figures in each bracket.
For bracket and percentage figures, see note 119 supra. The location of the percentage
figure for "$100,000 and over" was arbitrarily placed at the top of the valuation index
on the graph, representing a figure of $125,000.
The Wisconsin Study curve is derived from Ward & Buescher 412. The graph was con-
structed in the same manner as the Chicago Study curve. For brackets and percentage fig-
ures, see note 122 supra. The percentage figure for the 15-25 bracket plotted substantially
off the curve developed from the other figures. The reason for this is that in the sample
year 1934 this bracket showed a percentage testate of 0.0 (the other years ranged between
25% and 90%). Ibid. This distortion was deemed to be due to the small size of the sam-
ple, and therefore the percentage figure for this bracket was not used in constructing the
curve.
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was transmitted in testate estates. $4,031,458 was transmitted
by will as against $441,680 by intestacy. 24
The Spouse's Share by Will
When a married individual elects to dispose of his or her assets at
death by will rather than through the legislature's intestate plan, how
does the surviving spouse fare in the competition for the testator's
blessing? Do the patterns of testation indicate that the survivor's in-
terest is typically limited to support for the remaining years; or is
means of support something the testator is willing to leave to the sur-
vivor to work out on his or her own; or is the bulk of married persons'
wealth left outright to the spouse, presumably on the theory that in
the long run this is the best way to care for the objects of the testator's
bounty? Of course, more than the testator's attitude about his family
and his marital obligations will enter into the decision. In high valu-
ation estates, estate tax consequences will loom large and may affect
both the size of the share going to the surviving spouse and the restric-
tions placed on the share. Even so, there remain discernible differences
in pattern between dispositions designed to protect the spouse within
the context of sound tax planning and dispositions designed to dis-
inherit.
In analyzing probate records in terms of testate versus intestate
estates, the New York Study limited itself to the question of whether
there was a will and specifically omitted compiling data on the fre-
quency and ways in which testamentary dispositions differed from the
intestacy law.' 25 However, both the Chicago12 6 and Wisconsin 27 studies
did include some analysis of dispositive patterns, and the New Jersey
Wills Study128 also included some useful data.
a. The spouse's share: life estate versus an interest in fee. Fried-
man, in his study of 19th century wills in New Jersey, noted a marked
trend, over the course of the century, away from testamentary dispo-
sitions creating limited interests (trusts and life estates) and toward
dispositions creating outright interests. 2 9 This trend was directly re-
124 Dunham. In 1949, the president of one of the major trust companies in Hawaii
estimated that "approximately 85% in dollar value of the estates of deceased persons [in
Hawaii] are devised and bequeathed by valid wills." Steadman, The Trust Business in
Hawaii, Trust Bull., Nov., 1949, pp. 14, 18. No indication was given as to the basis for
the estimate.
125 See Powell & Looker 921 n.8.
128 Dunham.
1227 Ward 6 Buescher.
128 Friedman.
129 Id. at 41.
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flected in the types of dispositions made by testators for their surviving
spouses.130
In 1850 the number of wills which made at least some non-
fee disposition for the widow was more than twice that of
wills which made fee dispositions only. In 1875 non-fee dis-
positions had only a slight margin (23 to 19), and by 1900
fee dispositions had a substantial majority (17 to 10). Thus
the earlier the will in Essex County, the more likely it was
to make non-fee gifts to the wife. (Gifts to husbands-which
occurred only in 1875 and 1900-were usually gifts out-
right.)3 1
As the pattern toward the latter part of the century shifted away
from the life estate and toward fee dispositions, the surviving spouse
benefited. "Fee-disposition wills frequently left everything to the sur-
viving spouse; it is likely that some of these wills were drafted for that
very reason."'132 Friedman concluded that "among those who executed
wills, there was a marked tendency to increase the share of the sur-
viving spouse.' 33
The Wisconsin Study remarks that "during the years under exam-
ination, life estates created by will (trust and non-trust) ... comprised
an average of 24% of the testate estates."' 134 This probably means that
24% of the testate estates contained wills having one or more pro-
visions creating life estates. While there was considerable fluctuation
among the five years studied, and "no particular trend seems appar-
ent," 35 the overall percentage figure is consistent with the downward
trend noted in the New Jersey Study. 36
With respect to life estates and the surviving spouse, the Wisconsin
Study reports:
As was to be expected, life estates were created primarily for
the benefit of the deceased's spouse (80%). Widows were the
beneficiaries in 75% of the life estates created by trust, and
they were the life tenants in 60.7% of the other life estates.
Surviving husbands became life tenants in 17.8% of the cases.
In the remainder of the cases, life tenancies are distributed
among various relatives. 37 •
130 Friedman's 150 testators consisted of 112 males and 38 females. Id. at 36.
131 Id. at 42-43.
132 Id. at 44.
133 Id. at 53.
134 Ward & Beuscher 418.
135 Ibid. ,
136 Friedman's figures give percentages of: 1850-68%; 1875--55%; 1900-37%. Fried-
man 43.
137 Ward & Beuscher 419.
1966]
The University of Chicago Law Review
b. The spouse's share: competition with other survivors. The New
Jersey Study reveals that in each of the years studied a substantial
number of the wills examined made no provision at all for a surviving
spouse. 138 In 1850, 11 of the 30 wills, or 37%, had no provision for a
spouse; in 1875, it was 18 out of 60, or 30%; while in 1900 the figures
were 33 out of 60, or 55%. Does this mean that there was a high
incidence of marital disinheritance, or does it mean, as Friedman con-
tends in regard to the 1900 figures, that "clearly most of these testators
were unmarried or widowed"? 139 Unfortunately, without further data,
no supportable conclusions can be drawn.
The Wisconsin Study140 included an analysis of the extent to which
the wills deviated from the distribution provided by law. Table 5
reproduces this information for the combined five years studied.
TABLE 5
DEVIATIONS FROM DISTRIBUTION PROVIDED BY LAW-WISCONSIN STUDY 14 1
No. Wills Per cent
Distribution identical with that provided by law 14 8.6
No heirs omitted, distribution almost identicala 19 11.6
No heirs omitted, but substantial variance in distribution 70 42.0
One or more heirs omitted 61 37.4
Totals 164 99.6
a A distribution "almost identical" with that provided by law is of course a matter of
judgment on which there might not be complete agreement between several observers.
For instance the devise of a life estate in land was not deemed "almost identical" with a
widow's fee simple dower right, but the devise of a life estate to a widow with full power
of appointment was.
Source: See note 141.
The data does not provide direct information on the extent to which
a surviving spouse was favored or disfavored in those cases in which
there was substantial deviation or in which heirs were entirely omitted.
However, as part of the explanation of the category in the table "one
or more heirs omitted," the Study stated:
The table shows that in 87.4% of all wills one or more heirs
is not provided for. But in almost 40% of these cases the will
devised all or practically all of the estate to the surviving
spouse-a not unnatural distrib~ution. As a matter of fact,
practically all testators transferred their property "within the
family."142
188 Friedman 43.
139 Id. at 46.
140 Ward & Beuscher.
141 Taken from Ward & Beuscher 44. The explanatory quotation is from id. at 413.
142 Ibid.
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The Chicago Study143 gave detailed information both on patterns
of deviation as related to various classes of survivors and on the treat-
ment accorded the surviving spouse when deviation occurred. The
relationship of the survivor class to deviation is illustrated in Table 6.
TABLE 6
TESTAMENTARY DEVIATION FROM INTESTATE DISRIBUTION-CHICAGO STUDy1 4 4
Percentage of all Total no.
testate that of testate
deviate from estates
Survivor intestate rule involved
(1) (2)
Spouse and children 100 22
Spouse without children 83 6
Children without spouse 69 35
Neither spouse nor children
but brothers or sisters 89
Other relatives survive 100
Not given.
Source: See note 144.
The first two entries in Table 6 reflect those estates in which a spouse
survived the testator. If a decedent was survived by a spouse and chil-
dren, the Illinois intestacy laws145 provided the surviving spouse with
only one-third of the estate and the children the remaining two-
thirds.146 As Table 6 indicates, 100% of the decedents in this category
who left a will deviated from the statutory scheme. An examination
of the twenty-two wills involved showed that 100% of these deviating
decedents left all of their property to their surviving spouse.147
143 Dunham.
144 Column (1) is from Dunham 252, with the exception of the percentage of deviation
figure for the category "spouse without children," shown as 83. The Chicago Study gave
this percentage figure as 17. Ibid. This was derived by comparing the testate distri-
bution pattern of the estates involved with the intestacy rule regarding personalty. Only
one of the wills, or 17%, deviated from the "all to the spouse" rule. On the other hand,
it can be seen that all except one, or 83% deviated from the rule regarding realty. See
text accompanying note 144 supra. As the question under investigation here is the extent
to which the surviving spouse receives favored treatment, it was felt that the 83% figure
was both statistically accurate and more representative of the point at issue.
Column (2) is derived from Dunham 252-54.
145 It is not clear from the Chicago Study whether the Study data from which table 6
supra was constructed was obtained from the 1953 or 1957 group of estates. As the rele-
vant pattern of intestate distribution was not changed during the period, the information
is not critical. It should be noted, however, that the rule for distribution when there
is a surviving spouse but no descendants of the deceased was changed by the 1963 Legis-
lature. See note 148 infra.
146 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 11 (Supp. 1965).
147 Dunham 252.
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If a decedent was survived by a spouse but no children, the surviv-
ing spouse was entitled to all of the personal estate and one-half of
the real estate.148 Table 6 indicates that 83%, or five out of the six
wills involved, deviated from this scheme. Furthermore, an examina-
tion of these six wills showed that five left everything to the surviving
spouse.1 49 The one deviant from this was the will of a female testator.
Thus the pattern of distribution when there was a surviving spouse
is clear: twenty-seven out of the twenty-eight wills left all to the sur-
viving spouse. The author of the Chicago Study concluded: "The
above material indicates that there is no need in practice for a non-
barrable share for the surviving spouse; the surviving spouse is given
much more than the statutory one-third in a very high percentage of
the wills."'150
C. The Surviving Spouse's Choice: Frequency of Elections
Against the Will
Do surviving spouses agree with the author of the Chicago Study
that there is no need in practice for a nonbarrable share? The answer
to this question must be sought in an analysis of empirical data on
the frequency with which spouses choose the legislative share over
that given by the deceased and the economic circumstances in which
spouses find themselves when the choices are made. Unfortunately,
data on the frequency of spouses' elections are nonexistent. None of the
studies of probate court files previously discussed mentioned the point.
In an effort to obtain some information on this point, a survey by
questionnaire was made of a sample of Illinois attorneys with estate
practices. Details of the survey and the questions asked and answers
given can be found in Appendix A. The information presented in the
following paragraphs is taken from the data set out in this appendix.
There were 84 attorney-respondents in the sample. Seventy-five listed
business addresses. Of these, a third practiced in Chicago, 23% in
other large cities (population more than 60,000), 21% in smaller cities
(population between 25,000 and 60,000), and 23% in towns smaller
than 25,000. Seventy-seven reported on the size of the firm with which
they practiced. Eighty-two per cent of this number were sole practi-
tioners or were members of small firms (2 to 6 attorneys).
The respondents reported that in a one year period they participated
in a total of 1,513 probate proceedings.
148 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 11 (1961). This provision was changed in 1963 to give the
surviving spouse the entire estate when there are no descendants of the deceased. ILL.
RFV. STAT., ch. 3, § 11 (Supp. 1965).
149 Dunham 253.
150 Id. at 255.
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In 717 of these proceedings, or 47%, there was a surviving spouse.
There were 19 reported cases in which the spouse chose the share
given by the legislature rather than that given by the deceased. This
was slightly over 1% of the total number of proceedings and 2.6% of
the proceedings in which there was a surviving spouse.
The respondents were asked to give their opinion as to why those
spouses who elected against the deceased's will did so. Of the nineteen
spouses who elected, eight were judged to have been avoiding an at-
tempt to disinherit them. Four others wanted a larger share, but in
circumstances in which the size of the testamentary gift was thought
not to have been the result of family disharmony. Thus, it can be
seen that in the estates in which there was a surviving spouse, there
was a felt need for protection from disinheritance, intentional or inad-
vertent, in somewhat less than 2% of the cases.
Would the picture change if testators were not faced with the fact
of choice-the power of the survivor to force the gift? The respondents
were asked how many wills they drew in a year for married individuals
and how many of these individuals, in the attorney's judgment, would
have made a different provision for the spouse if there was not a non-
barrable share available. Of the 3,441 married testators for whom wills
were drafted, the respondents identified 84 testators, or 2.4%, who
would have made a different disposition if there had been no threat
of the surviving spouse's election.
The strikingly low percentage of elections cannot easily be attrib-
uted to an inadequate legislative alternative. Indeed, the Illinois Legis-
lature has given the surviving spouse not one but two alternatives to
the deceased's testamentary gift. The spouse (and the choice is avail-
able to both husband and wife) may renounce the will and elect to
take a statutory share of one-third of the succession estate (both real
and personal) if the deceased has a surviving descendant, or one-half
if there is no surviving descendant. 51 A second alternative is available;
instead of the fractional interest in the succession realty, the spouse
can take dower in any realty of which the deceased was seized during
the marriage.152 This dower alternative is in addition to the fractional
share of the succession personalty and can be taken on a parcel-by-
parcel basis. Thus, the surviving spouse in Illinois can choose one-
third to one-half of the personalty and either one-third to one-half
in fee or a dower interest in each parcel of real estate, as desired. Few
states offer more.
151 ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 3, § 16 (1961).
152 IL.r RE v. STAT., ch. 3, § 18 (1961).
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III. SUMMARY AND SOME OBSERVATIONS
The purpose of this study is to bring together in one place the avail-
able data on patterns of wealth transmission at death and to relate these
data to the special situation of the surviving spouse. On the basis of
empirical data presently available, it is premature to attempt to draw
any firm conclusions as to what is sensible social policy regarding the
rights of the surviving spouse and the extent to which present legis-
lative attitudes reflect sound policy. By the same token, it would be pre-
mature to criticize here the several current proposals for reform.153 But
there are some observations that appear warranted.
The vagaries of human behavior are never adequately described in
mathematical terms. Nor are solutions to social problems found by
careful attention to sums. Dr. Johnson's aphorism is apt: "round num-
bers are always false." But statistics can reveal patterns and changes in
patterns which can be meaningfully related to the judgments involved
in the determination of policy regarding the rights of surviving
spouses.154 This is true even if the effect of the data is to prove what
we already believe. To believe is one thing; to act on the basis of un-
supported belief is something else.
What policy implications are there in the material developed thus
far? It is apparent that the evidence is quite inconclusive on the ques.
tion of whether there is a trend toward increasing efforts to disinherit
spouses. It is clearer that will substitutes in various forms are exten-
sively used by married individuals, but there is no reason to believe
the spouse generally fares poorly in these; indeed, the evidence points
to the contrary. Nevertheless, the popularity of will substitutes indi-
cates that this is an area requiring careful scrutiny and warranting
specific treatment by the policy maker.
If anything is clear from the available statistics, it is that more and
more individuals are disposing of whatever wealth they have by will
153 See authorities cited note 6 supra.
154 These judgments are constantly under review. The Section of Real Property,
Probate and Trust Law of the American Bar Association and the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have each within the last several years ap-
pointed special committees concerned with model or uniform probate acts. A committee
of the Wisconsin Bar Association has been working on a proposed revision of the Wis-
consin Probate Law. In 1961 the New York Legislature established a Temporary State
Commission on the Modernization, Revision and Simplification of the Law of Estates
One of the major areas the Commission has under study is the surviving spouse's right
of election. In the spring of 1964 the Illinois State Bar Association polled its membership
to determine desired topics for bar meeting programs. Among those at the top of the
favored list was "Let's Abolish Dower." The effect of marital rights on marketability of
property continues to plague the courts and intrigue the scholars. See e.g., Boyer and
Miller, Furthering Title Marketability By Substantive Reforms With Regard To Marital
Rights, 18 U. MmxAa L. Rav. 561 (1964).
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rather than through intestate succession and that the more wealth they
have, the more likely it is that a will will be employed. To the extent
wealth holders die intestate, the solution to the surviving spouse's situ-
ation is relatively simple. The legislature and the deceased have agreed
on what the survivor is to get and there is no conflict of policies. 15
But when wealth-holders use a will, the stage is set for a potential
conflict between society's and the testator's concern for the surviving
spouse. This is true whether the issue arises out of a testator's desire
to punish the spouse, or simply because he applies a different standard
of need.
This leads to the final and perhaps the most significant finding, and
here the evidence is strikingly consistent. The married testator on the
whole shows little inclination to avenge himself at death for the slights
and frictions of marital bliss. If the balance is struck it is not done so
publicly. For the total society this has real meaning: the need for a
surviving spouse's choice between the deceased spouse's testamentary
largess and the legislatively-decreed share is not a need of massive
proportions. The machinery designed to satisfy this need need not be
massive and insensitive; on the contrary, the dimensions of need are
such as to compel the conclusion that the machinery should be keyed
to individuation and able to adjust its impact to the circumstances
calling it into play.156
Addendum: A Note on Data Studies and Some Implications For
Future Research
By far the most useful information and that having the greatest pro-
bative value was developed by the two studies of probate court rec-
ords. 57 At the same time, these data, for several reasons, were among
the most difficult to analyze. The studies did not begin from a common
base. While there was an underlying similarity of purpose, the ap-
proaches were divergent. This divergence meant that the same types
of information were not routinely reported. In some cases it was neces-
sary to reconstruct data in order to make valid comparisons; in other
cases meaningful comparisons were impossible.
Some types of information, such as that on spouses' elections, was
not reported by either study. Furthermore, the process of analyzing
and collating the reported information was made doubly difficult by
155 This assumes, of course, that the intestate share of the surviving spouse is realistic
in terms of need and size of estate, a generally unrealistic assumption. See the proposal
for reform of the Statute of Distributions in Dunham at 257.
156 See Laufer, Flexible Restraints on Testamentary Freedom-A Report on Decedents'
Family Maintenance Legislation, 69 HAv L. Rv. 277 (1955); articles cited note 6 supra.
157 Dunham; Ward & Beuscher.
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the absence in a number of instances of clear identification of the data
source. Nevertheless, these two studies yielded a wealth of important
information on property transmission practices and established con-
clusively the value of probate court records as a source of useful em-
pirical data.
What is needed then is a whole series of studies of probate court
records.' 58 The patterns of wealth transmission thus developed will not
only portray national characteristics, but will reflect the differences
resulting from variations in geographical, cultural, and economic con-
ditions. Finally, it must be emphasized that in order to maximize the
usefulness of these studies they must be based on a research design
that will produce transmissible information. This means that when-
ever possible the initial data-gathering should include all information
available in the records. It would be unfortunate if the time and effort
required to make records studies were expended without careful atten-
tion being given to the scope of the data collection. Moreover, the
presentation of the data in published studies should be made in such
a way as to be meaningful to the reader who wishes to make indepen-
dent analyses of the data. 159 This is essential if valid comparisons are
to be made between different studies.
APPENDrX A
This appendix presents detailed information on the survey ques-
tionnaire discussed in the section entitled The Surviving Spouse's
Choice: Frequency of Elections Against the Will, supra p. 712.
The questionnaire was distributed to approximately 400 attorneys
attending a short course on estate planning in April, 1964, sponsored
by the Institute on Continuing Education of the Illinois Bar. Eighty-
four questionnaires were completed and returned. A profile of the
respondents is given in the text.160 The information for the profile
was obtained from preliminary questions asked in an explanatory cover
letter included with each questionnaire.
Following is the questionnaire with tabulated total responses indi-
cated. Unless otherwise noted, the data given is based on 84 completed
responses to each question.
158 See e.g., Frontiers of Legal Research, 7 AMER. BEHAVIORAL Sc1ENTIST No. 4 (1963).
In 1962 both the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law of the American Bar
Association and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ap-
pointed special committees to undertake studies looking to promulgation of a model or
uniform probate code. It has been reported that in connection with these studies a
proposal has been made to conduct field research in the various states on the actual
dispositions currently being made by testators.
159 For an excellent illustration of how the social scientist presents his source mate-
rials and explains the procedures followed in reaching his conclusions, see Lampman,
THE SHARE or Top WEALTH-HOLDERS IN NATIONAL WEALTH (1962).
160 See p. 712 supra.
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The Spouse's Nonbarrable Share
Questionnaire on Surviving Spouse's Elections
Please answer the following questions on the basis of a one year
period. Indicate the period you are using (select the period most con-
venient for you and for which you have available information):
F1 Calendar year 1963 [67 respondents checked this item].
F1 12 month period ending with the date this questionnaire is filled
out, which date is - [16 respondents checked this item].
[I Other (please specify) [1 respondent indicated a 7V month period
from Sept. 1, 1963].
Elections During Probate
1. Give the number of probate proceedings (wills only, not
including intestate proceedings) in which you were profes-
sionally involved during the selected year, listed according
to the capacities in which you served:
a. personal representative (executor, admin. cta., etc.) ... 172
b. attorney for the personal representative ............ 960
c. attorney for surviving spouse ...................... 159
d. attorney for a legatee, devisee or heir, other than a
surviving spouse ................................. 92
e. attorney for a creditor of the deceased .............. 91
f. other (such as a combination of some of those listed) .. 9
2. Out of the total number of cases listed in question 1, indi-
cate how many of the cases involved a decedent who was
survived by a spouse ................................ 717
3. Of the number of cases in which a surviving spouse was
involved (question 2), indicate in how many cases the
spouse actually elected against the deceased's will:
a. by renouncing the will and taking a statutory share in
fee (Ill. Prob. Act. § 16) .......................... 18
b. by making the additional election of dower (§ 18) in-
stead of the statutory share in realty ............... 1
4. If known, indicate as to the cases in which an election was
actually made against the will (question 3), whether the
primary motivation for making the election was:
a. to increase the share of the estate received by the sur-
viving spouse, the decedent's will making inadequate
provision, probably because of poor family relations
between them. (give number of cases) .............. 8
b. to increase the share of the estate received by the sur-
viving spouse, the decedent's will making inadequate
provision, probably because of change of circumstances,
outdated will, etc., and not because of poor family
relations. (give number of cases) ................... 4
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c. to save on taxes for the entire estate (by increasing the
marital deduction, etc.) without particular reference
to whether it changed the size of the surviving spouse's
share vis-4-vis the other legatees. (give number of
cases) ........................................... 3
d. other (please specify) ............................. 3
Will Drafting
5. Give the total number of wills you drafted (or participated
in the drafting of) during the selected year for testators
(male or female) who had a spouse .................... 3,441
6. Out of the number given in question 5, how many testators,
in your judgment, would have made a different disposition
of their property than that finally incorporated in their
will if there had not been the threat of the surviving
spouse's election. (give number) ...................... 84
Of these, how many probably would have substantially or
totally disinherited the spouse if they legally could. (give
num ber) ........................................... 50
Source identification. In order to have some check on the credi-
bility of the answers received, those questions calling for statistical
data (questions 1, 2, 3, and 5) were each followed by a source-identi-
fication question:
"The answers I gave to this question were based on (check
one): a. l a survey of my files or records; b. an estimate
which I consider to be-] quite accurate; LI reasonably
accurate; ] fairly rough."
The responses to the source-identification questions are presented here
in tabular form:
TABLE 7
RrSPONES To SOURCF-In ENIrCATION QUsIONS
Response Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 5
No. % No. % No. % No. %
1. Response
(a)-survey of files or records 13 15.6 13 17.1 12 17.9 8 9.6"
2. Response
(b)-estimate considered to be
a) quite accurate 26 30.9 19 25.0 43 64.2 21 25.3
b) reasonably accurate 39 46.4 38 50.0 12 17.9 44 53.1
c) fairly rough 6 7.1 6 7.9 0 0 10 12.0
Total Responses 84 100.0 76* 100.0 67* 100.0 83* 100.0
* Note: Some of the respondents who answered the basic questions did not complete
the source identification part.
